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Abstract
A network intrusion is any unauthorized activity on a computer network. There are host-
based and network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS’s), of which there are each signature-
based and anomaly-based detection methods. An anomalous network behavior can be defined
as an intentional violation of the expected sequence of packets. In a real-time network-based
IDS, incoming packets are treated as a stream of data. A stream processor takes any stream
of data or events and extracts interesting patterns on the fly. This representation allows ap-
plying statistical anomaly detection using sequence prediction algorithms as well as using a
stream processor to perform signature-based intrusion detection and sequence extraction from
a stream of packets. In this thesis, a Multidimensional Sequence to Multidimensional Se-
quence (MSeq2MSeq) encoder-decoder model is proposed to predict sequences of packets and
an adaptive and functionally auto-scaling stream processor: “Wisdom” is proposed to process
streams of packets. The proposed MSeq2MSeq model trained on legitimate traffic is able to
detect Neptune Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and Port Scan probes with 100% detection rate
using the DARPA 1999 dataset. A hybrid algorithm using Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
and Bisection algorithms was developed to optimize Complex Event Processing (CEP) rules in
“Wisdom”. Adaptive CEP rules optimized by the above algorithm was able to detect FTP Brute
Force attack, Slow Header DoS attack, and Port Scan probe with 100% detection rate while
processing over 2.5 million events per second. An adaptive and functionally auto-scaling IDS
was built using the MSeq2MSeq model and “Wisdom” stream processor to detect and prevent
attacks based on anomalies and signature in real-time. The proposed IDS adapts itself to obtain
best results without human intervention and utilizes available system resources in functionally
auto-scaling deployment. Results show that the proposed IDS detects FTP Brute Force attack,
Slow Header DoS attack, HTTP Unbearable Load King (HULK) DoS attack, SQL Injection
attack, Web Brute Force attack, Cross-site scripting attack, Ares Botnet attack, and Port Scan
probe with a 100% detection rate in a real-time environment simulated from the CICIDS 2017
dataset.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The rise in popularity of cloud computing has caused data and software housed in local work-
stations to migrate to remote servers. The Internet of Things (IoT) and mobile devices heavily
rely on services provided over the Internet. Availability of user data in a central point and the
single point of failure attract attackers to breach servers. Intrusion Detection Systems are being
used to detect such attacks in a network or a host. However, these days there are a lot of tools
developed to automate attacks. New attacks are being invented by evading the detection tech-
niques used to prevent existing attacks. For example, GoldenEye Denial of Service (DoS) [1]
attack evades HTTP Unbearable Load King (HULK) DoS [2] detectors by adding randomness
to packets. Therefore, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) should be able to detect unknown
attacks or at least should be able to adapt to detect evolving attacks.
There are host-based and network-based intrusion detection systems, of which there are
each signature and anomaly based methods [3]. Anomaly-based systems detect intrusions
based on anomalous behaviors observed in a network. There are no ideal machine learning
models to detect anomalous packets with a 0 prediction accuracy. Therefore a minimum pre-
diction accuracy threshold is used to classify anomalous packets. Such anomaly-based IDS’s
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require a large amount of anomalous traffic to detect attacks with enough confidence. For
example, in a SYN Flood DoS attack, the attacker sends a large number of SYN requests to
the victim, which is a noticeable anomalous traffic in a network. However, attacks targeting
selected system vulnerabilities using a few number of packets are hard to detect for anomaly-
based systems. Signature-based systems detect attacks based on predefined attack specific rules
regardless of the number of packets involved in the attack. For example, a Structured Query
Language (SQL) Injection attack is easy to detect by looking for SQL keywords in request
parameters.
Figure 1.1: TCP Three-way Handshake – a legitimate TCP sequence starts with SYN, fol-
lowed by SYN-ACK and ends with ACK.
In this research, an anomaly-based network intrusion is defined as an intentional violation
of expected behavior or network protocols. A network protocol is a well-defined sequence of
packets often represented by a state machine. For example, a Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) handshake as shown in Figure 1.1 is a sequence of three TCP packets with TCP flags:
(SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK). An intentional violation of this rule in Direct SYN Flood DoS attack
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as depicted in Figure 1.2 is an anomalous sequence with a large number of (SYN, SYN-ACK,
SYN, SYN-ACK, ...) packets in which the order of SYN-ACK may differ. The ability of machine
learning algorithms trained on legitimate traffic to detect unseen attacks makes them suitable
for anomaly-based IDS’s. Researchers have already proposed several machine learning algo-
rithms to detect network intrusions [4, 5]. To the best of my knowledge, none of them except
Bontemps et al. have taken advantage of the sequential relationship of packets in a legitimate
network connection to detect intrusions. Bontemps et al. aligned packets arrived in a prede-
fined interval as a sequence and trained a stacked Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Recurrent
Neural Network (RNN) to predict last n − 3 packets using first 3 packets of a sequence where
n is the number of packets in a sequence [6]. However, their definition of the sequence may
include completely unrelated packets from different connections which can drastically reduce
the accuracy. Grouping packets arrived in a predefined interval as a sequence gives rise to
unrealistic sequences depending on external factors such as peak business time.
Figure 1.2: Direct SYN Flood – an intentional violation of TCP three-way handshake in which
the attacker keeps sending SYN requests.
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Sommer and Paxson discussed some of the challenges in using machine learning for in-
trusion detection including a) high cost of errors, b) semantic gaps like alert generation and
organization-specific policies, c) diversity of network traffic, and d) lack of appropriate pub-
lic datasets [7]. Even though these problems still exist in machine learning based intrusion
detection, signature-based IDS’s like Snort [8] are less affected by these problems because a
carefully developed signature-based rule generates a relatively smaller number of false alarms
than machine learning methods [3]. Commercial signature-based IDS’s provide the necessary
infrastructure to send alarms to interested stakeholders. In addition, signatures developed by
domain experts do not require public datasets to define those rules. However, diversity of net-
work traffic is a problem for signature-based IDS’s. For example, receiving more traffic in a
peak season is normal for an online retail service but receiving a similar amount of traffic on
a regular day can be a symptom of DoS attack. Signature-based IDS’s must be able to adapt
according to external conditions to overcome this problem. In addition, existing IDS’s do not
utilize available resources other than network packets. Using all data sources like network
packets, application logs, system logs, and policy changes can improve the detection ratio.
Complex Event Processing (CEP) is a reactive programming paradigm used in respond-
ing to real-time events based on predefined rules. Stream processors provide the necessary
infrastructure to develop and deploy CEP rules for a wide range of applications including
intrusion detection [9], healthcare [10], fleet management [11], and power grid [12]. Com-
mercial stream processors like Apache Flink [13], Esper [14], and WSO2 Stream Processor
[15] support different input sources and output sinks like File, Email, Hypertext Transfer Pro-
tocol (HTTP) connection, TCP connection, Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT)
connection, Databases, and Message Queues [16, 13]. Some products even support writing
custom receivers and producers with minimal effort [16, 13]. The ability of stream processors
to receive data from multiple sources and emit events to different receivers makes them a better
alternative to signature-based IDS’s. SQL like stream processing queries offered by most of
the stream processors are much more expressive and easy to learn than IDS rules. A common
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Figure 1.3: Intrusion Detection System – a high-level architecture of the adaptive and func-
tionally auto-scaling IDS developed using Wisdom Stream Processor and MSeq2MSeq model.
weakness of existing stream processors is their inability to adapt according to external condi-
tions. There were several attempts made on dynamic query deployment [17], adaptive stream
processing [18], and automatic query mining with an intention to replace domain experts with
machines [19, 20, 21, 22]. However, none of them were used outside of research environ-
ments due to the unrealistic assumptions made by researchers such as raw events not being
complex, or a single CEP rule template being able to represent all complex events. Therefore,
stream processors still require manual deployment of new queries when there is a change in
requirement and do not address the challenge of “diversity of network traffic” when it comes
to intrusion detection using stream processors.
In this research, a network-based IDS was built using both anomaly-based and signature-
based detection techniques as shown in Figure 1.3 with a preliminary focus on detecting attacks
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in real-time. Even though the proposed IDS is tested using network packets, the signature-
based rules of the proposed IDS can be used as a host-based IDS. The proposed IDS can
be hosted anywhere in a network and fed with packets captured using network monitoring
tools like Wireshark [23] and other required information like application logs in real-time. The
anomaly-based intrusion detection problem is mapped to multidimensional sequential anomaly
detection problem (see chapter 3.1 for details) and a novel Multidimensional-Sequence-to-
Multidimensional-Sequence (MSeq2MSeq) model based on the traditional Sequence-to-Sequence
(Seq2Seq) model [24] is proposed for real-time anomaly-based intrusion detection [25]. The
model was trained using packets from regular network traffic split into sequences. In testing,
actual packets highly deviating from predicted packets are classified as anomalies. Training the
model on normal traffic instead of intrusion traffic gives access to large training data and lets the
model detect even new unknown attacks those are deviating from a regular pattern. Humans are
better than machines at designing logical CEP rules due to their cognition. However, expecting
a human to modify deployed rules in real-time based on the dynamics of the operating envi-
ronment is not practical. To address this, a new adaptive and functionally auto-scaling stream
processor: “Wisdom” has been developed which can optimize its queries automatically using
swarm intelligence1 [27]. We use the term “functionally auto-scaling” to mean the ability of
“Wisdom” stream processor to add more features by starting or to reduce resource consumption
by stopping unwanted rules. Using such a self-tuning stream processor in intrusion detection
solves the problem of “diversity of network traffic” by adjusting thresholds on the fly based
on the dynamics of the environment. Humans also need an expressive language to code their
knowledge in defining an attack signature. Semantics used to define rules in popular IDS’s like
Snort are not expressive enough and hard to interpret for a novice user. Therefore, “Wisdom”
supports SQL like “Wisdom Query” language which is expressive enough for humans to code
their knowledge. At the same time, “Wisdom Query” also provides variables and annotations
which are used by the stream processor itself to optimize the rule and to automate deploy-
1Intelligent behavior of a decentralized population emerged by intractability and non-representability of indi-
vidual agents [26]. Swarm Intelligence is widely being used in decision making and optimization algorithms.
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ment. “Wisdom” stream processor is used to build other core components of the IDS including
signature-based detectors. “Wisdom” stream processor supports the following input sources:
HTTP endpoints, gRPC [28] endpoints, Apache Kafka [29] Topics, CSV files, and packet cap-
ture (pcap) files from which events may be read. Output event sinks implemented in “Wisdom”
include: HTTP endpoints, gRPC endpoints, Apache Kafka Topics, Console and Text files. New
input sinks and output source can be developed with minimal effort using “Wisdom” extension
library2. Variety of sources and sinks let the IDS read data from multiple sources including raw
network packets, system logs, application logs, and user feedback and send alerts to different
stakeholders like system admin, network firewall or even a dashboard for statistical purposes.
However, within the IDS, Apache Kafka is used to provide loosely coupled communication
between “Wisdom” applications3. Quality of a self-tuning CEP rule is highly determined by
the data used to tune threshold values at the runtime. Since we do not have control over what
is received at the runtime, the self-tuned rule may miss some attacks which could be detected
with original user-defined thresholds. To overcome this problem, a Minimum Rate Guaranteed
deployment of tunable signature-based rules is proposed (see Figure 1.3) using two additional
clones of the actual CEP rule which are used to tune the CEP rule in a sandbox and to detect
attacks using tuned CEP rule along with the actual rule (discussed in chapter 4.6.1).
In addition to the adaptiveness of stream processor, particular attention was paid on utilizing
system resources for intrusion detection. Stream processors like Apache Flink [13] supports
distributed deployment of rules where each CEP operators can be scaled up and down. Even
though stream processors can distribute and scale operators, not all stateful operators are hori-
zontally scalable [30]. Especially when it comes to dynamic CEP operators, it is hard to track
and atomically update them in a horizontally scaled environment. Therefore, a novel function-
ally auto-scaling deployment of CEP rules in a distributed environment is proposed to utilize
the available resources. As depicted in Figure 1.3, each “Wisdom” rule deployed in the IDS
2How to write a Wisdom extension is explained at https://slgobinath.github.io/wisdom/
wisdom-extensions
3In this thesis, “Wisdom application”, “Wisdom rule” and “Wisdom query” are used interchangeably to refer
a CEP logic developed using Wisdom stream processor.
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is a standalone microservice [31] application. Therefore they can be scaled up and down in-
dividually depending on the requirement. The “Wisdom Manager” and “Filter Query” along
with other rules form a functionally auto-scaling infrastructure to reduce the overall resource
consumption of the IDS. In this deployment, “Wisdom” queries with low priority are kept off
by the “Wisdom Manager” until some events related to those queries are sent by the “Fil-
ter Query”. More details about functionally auto-scaling deployment is discussed in Chapter
4.6.2 and the minimum resource consumption of the proposed functionally auto-scaling IDS is
demonstrated in Chapter 5.3.
The proposed machine learning model itself cannot solve the problems addressed by Som-
mer and Paxson. However, the signature-based IDS built on top of the adaptive stream proces-
sor generates a smaller number of false positives, and false negatives and adapts at the runtime
based on the diversity of network traffic. The ability of “Wisdom” stream processor in receiv-
ing and sending events through various protocols let the proposed IDS receive organization-
specific policies and send alerts to different stakeholders. Signature-based IDS’s do not require
datasets to define rules because attack signatures are developed by domain experts based on
how an attack works. It makes signature-based IDS’s not affected by the availability of public
dataset. Therefore, the proposed hybrid IDS supporting both signature-based detection and
anomaly-based detection successfully overcomes common challenges encountered in machine
learning based IDS’s. In Phase 1 evaluation, the proposed MSeq2MSeq model was compared
with the LSTM RNN model used by Bontemps et al. [25]. The model developed by Bontemps
et al. was able to detect Neptune DoS attack with 100% detection rate and 63 false alarms in
DARPA 1999 dataset [6]. The MSeq2MSeq model along with the definition of sequence was
able to detect Port Scan probe and Neptune DoS attack with 100% detection rate and only a
single false alarm was produced in DARPA 1999 dataset [25]. The proposed IDS was tested
with four signature-based rules and an anomaly-based rule against CICIDS 2017 dataset [32].
It was able to detect File Transfer Protocol (FTP) Brute Force attack, HTTP Slow Header DoS
attack, HULK DoS attack, SQL Injection attack, Web Brute Force attack, Cross-site scripting
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attack, Ares Botnet [33] attack, and Port Scan probe with 100% detection rate.
1.2 Contributions
To summarize, this thesis presents the following contributions:
• A novel MSeq2MSeq model which can be used in any multidimensional sequence pre-
diction problem like intrusion detection, weather prediction, and stock prediction is de-
veloped.
• An adaptive and functionally auto-scaling stream processor: “Wisdom” is implemented
which can be used for any stream processing applications such as intrusion detection,
fraud detection, and fleet management.
• Suitability of Bayesian Optimization Algorithm (BOA) and Particle Swarm Optimization
(PSO) for CEP rule optimization is compared, and a hybrid algorithm using PSO and
Bisection algorithm is implemented as part of the “Wisdom” Stream Processor.
• Prototype of a distributed IDS using MSeq2MSeq model for anomaly-based intrusion
detection and “Wisdom” stream processor for signature-based intrusion detection is de-
veloped and tested using CICIDS 2017 dataset. The proposed IDS supports adaptive
rules and functionally auto-scaling deployment with the support of “Wisdom” stream
processor. Minimum Rate Guaranteed deployment ensures that the adaptive rules will
never reduce the detection rate of initial rules with user-defined thresholds. Semantics
of the SQL like “Wisdom” query used in the proposed IDS is easy to learn than the
semantics of Snort [8] rules.
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1.3 Document Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: The mathematical formulation of map-
ping intrusion detection to sequence prediction problem and CEP rule optimization problem
are presented in Chapter 3. A literature review is presented in Chapter 2 which describes dif-
ferent intrusion detection techniques and early research activities on building dynamic stream
processors. In Chapter 4, the methodology of the proposed method is described in detail. It
contains detailed description and architecture of the MSeq2MSeq model, “Wisdom” stream
processor and the proposed IDS. Tests conducted to evaluate the MSeq2MSeq model, the IDS,
and functionally auto-scaling deployment are elaborated in Chapter 5. Obtained results in all
test cases are presented and discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, the conclusion of the research and
future work are discussed in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Intrusion Detection
Maheshkumar and Gursel used nine different pattern recognition, and machine learning al-
gorithms to detect attacks in the KDD CUP 1999 dataset [4]. The authors proposed a multi-
classifier model using Multilayer Perceptron for probe attacks, K-means algorithm for DoS and
User-to-Root (U2R) attacks, and Gaussian classifier for Remote-to-Local (R2L) attacks based
on the results they obtained. The proposed multi-classifier was able to detect probe attacks,
DoS attacks, U2R attacks, and R2L attacks with 0.887, 0.973, 0.298, and 0.096 detection rates
respectively. Since KDD CUP 1999 is a pre-processed and flattened dataset, this work does
not take advantage of the sequential relationship of packets.
Bontemps et al. used LSTM RNN based model to detect Neptune DoS attack with 100%
true positives and 63 false positives in the time series version of KDD CUP 1999 dataset using
collective anomalies in a network [6]. 63 false alarms in a five day period are not accept-
able for an IDS. In their research, the model was trained using attack-free traffic to predict a
sequence of packets using the first three packets. The average prediction error was used to
classify anomalies. Bontemps et al. defined all packets arrived within a fixed time window as
a sequence. However, within a time window, there can be packets from multiple connections
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and multiple clients which are independent of each other. Furthermore, packets arrived within
a time window is depending on external factors like peak business hours which do not have
a constant pattern. Therefore their proposed solution may not give the claimed accuracy with
real datasets.
Lobato et al. used stream processors with machine learning algorithm to detect DoS and
probe attacks in real-time [34]. They used a stream processor to receive logs from applications
and packets from Bro Network Security Monitor [35]. The authors used Decision Tree, Artifi-
cial Neural Network (ANN), and Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithms for unsupervised
classification and obtained above 90% accuracy with ANN and SVM algorithms. Though they
used stream processor, it was not used for signature-based detection. Furthermore, the ANN
used in this research is just a linear regression model which does not take advantage of the
sequential order of packets. Therefore it has no significant difference from Maheshkumar et
al.’s work [4].
Massimo and Luigi proposed a signature-based IDS using a stream processor [9]. In this
work, authors assumed that an attack requires some mandatory pre-steps to complete and de-
veloped CEP rules to detect those patterns. For example, they assumed that an SQL Injection
attack always starts with a Port Scan followed by Directory Traversal and Buffer Overflow
within a predefined time frame. However, the authors agree that it is hard to define an interval
which covers all these steps because an attacker may execute each of them at different times
depending on his level of patience. Furthermore, a hacker can attack a known public endpoint
using SQL Injection without scanning open ports. Therefore, this methodology is not suitable
for a real IDS.
2.2 Sequence to Sequence Encoder Decoder Model
Intrusion detection based on anomalies in a sequence of packets requires a machine learning
model to predict sequences of packets. Similar sequence prediction problem has been already
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Figure 2.1: Sequence to Sequence Encoder Decoder Model – a stacking recurrent architec-
ture for translating a source sequence “I am a student” into a target sequence “Je suis e´tudiant”.
Here, marks the end of a sequence. [45]
addressed in Neural Machine Translation (NMT) in which source and translated sentences are
treated as sequences of words. NMT researchers have moved from LSTM RNN to Seq2Seq
Encoder-Decoder model since the work of Sutskever et al. [24]. The model was later improved
by other researchers and became the state-of-the-art solution in NMT [24, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40].
For example, the sentence “I am a student” in English can be translated into “Je suis e´tudiant”
in French using Seq2Seq model as shown in Figure 2.1. The Seq2Seq model is also used in
object recognition in video [41, 42] and anomaly detection in series of events [43]. Malhotra et
al. used stacked LSTM RNN and Seq2Seq model to detect anomalous sensor data [43, 44]. In
their research, Seq2Seq model gave better results for unpredictable datasets, whereas stacked
LSTM RNN gave better results for predictable datasets [43].
The sequence in NMT is a sentence formulated by words in a given order. Similarly, the
sequence in video analysis is a grid of pixels aligned sequentially. In both cases, elements of
a sequence are one-dimensional items such as words or pixels. Datasets used by Malhotra et
al. also contain sequences of single dimensional sensor readings. However, in packet predic-
tion, both input and output are sequences of multidimensional packets. Selected attributes of
a packet may or may not have interdependencies. In such a multidimensional Seq2Seq prob-
lem, the model must learn those interdependencies and the contribution of each attribute in
predicting the following element.
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In NMT, some words are more important than others. Attention layers were introduced
to the Seq2Seq model to focus on the more relevant word in source sentence [37, 38, 39]. In
a video frame, some pixels may be more important than others. Such important pixels are
extracted using convolutional encoders [41, 42]. Sutskever et al. reversed the encoder input
to introduce short-term dependencies and obtained a better result in English to French NMT
because it reduces the average distance between target words [24]. Luong et al. also obtained
better results by reversing the input sentence in English to German NMT [38]. Bahdanau et al.
used Bidirectional Recurrent Neural Network (BiRNN) instead of LSTM in Seq2Seq model
which can read input sequence in both directions [37].
2.3 Adaptive Stream Processor
Machine learning algorithms for anomaly detection and publicly available stream processors do
not address the problem of “diversity of network traffic” as discussed in Chapter 1. Even though
several attempts were made to build adaptive stream processors, all of them were limited to cer-
tain domains and datasets due to the unrealistic assumptions made by researchers. This section
briefly analyzes such attempts and their applicability to intrusion detection. Mousheimish et al.
proposed automatic predictive CEP rule mining from classified multivariate time series dataset
[19]. Their learning algorithm first searches for subsequences across a time series input. The
length of possible subsequences is limited by user-defined lower and upper bounds. Later,
it prunes redundant parts of subsequences and builds a CEP rule using subsequence with the
highest accuracy. This approach is limited by user-defined sequence lengths and limited CEP
rule templates which are not guaranteed to fit all use cases.
Margara et al. developed iCEP which can generate CEP rules using time window, selector,
logical operator, pattern, and aggregator [20]. iCEP learns interesting events and time frame
followed by aggregators and filters, and finally parameters and sequences in an independent
three-phase pipeline. In this approach, errors made in early stages of the pipeline can prop-
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agate and affect the following learners. For example, if “Time Window Learner” does not
capture all the necessary events, “Sequence Learner” cannot learn a sequence at the end of
the pipeline. Isolated learning phases of iCEP fail to address the correlation between CEP
operators. Therefore, a rule generated by iCEP may not perform well on a highly correlated
domain.
Lee et al. proposed CEP rule mining based on similarity match [21]. In this work, authors
clustered event sequences, extracted a complex event based on similarity across sequences from
the same cluster and finally generated a complex event pattern using Markov Transition model.
The proposed clustering algorithm calculates the distance between two sequences based on the
cosine similarity between individual events and their position in sequence. The attribute to
calculate cosine similarity is determined by domain experts.
Mehdiyev et al. used Elitist Pareto-based Multi-Objective Evolutionary Algorithm to select
event attributes and Fuzzy Unordered Rule Induction Algorithm to classify events [22]. Au-
thors compared the proposed algorithm with other classification algorithms but did not propose
a way to generate CEP rules using the proposed algorithm. They also admit that generating
CEP rules from the output of their classifier is a difficult challenge to address.
All above CEP rule mining methodologies were developed with an intention to replace do-
main experts with machines. However, they rely on false assumptions like raw events not being
complex, TimeWindow being enough to collect events in all scenarios, or a single CEP rule
template being able to represent all complex events. These assumptions oversimplify the prob-
lem and do not capture the real world requirements. Furthermore, these solutions mainly focus
on generating rules for frequently occurring patterns. In anomaly driven domains like intru-
sion detection, such frequently occurring patterns represent legitimate traffic in training data.
Hence rules developed using frequently occurring patterns may not work well for detecting
anomalous traffic.
Turchin et al. defined CEP rules based on probability score of selected attributes and tuned
threshold values using Discrete Kalman Filter based on expert feedback and event history [18].
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The concept of tuning rule parameters and the application of adaptive rules to detect attacks in
DARPA 1999 dataset are close to this research. Therefore, Turchin et al.’s results have been
chosen as a benchmark to compare the results obtained in this research. However, their contri-
bution to CEP rule optimization may not be widely applicable because their rules neither use
any CEP operators like Filter1 or Window2 nor follow CEP semantics. Therefore, their solu-
tion does not address any problems we raised in Chapter 3.2 such as correlated parameters or
discontinuous function. Instead, they calculate anomalous probability score of request length,
response length, possible “SYN” error, and hostname for each packet. A packet is classified as
an anomaly by comparing the total score of these four attributes with two threshold values. Us-
ing anomalous probability score of the hostname will give high accuracy in a simulated dataset
but not in an actual deployment. For example, in CICIDS 2017 dataset, Firewall translates the
hostnames of most of the attackers to the same IP address. Similarly, in DARPA 1999 dataset,
same hosts were reused multiple times to simulate different attacks. In both these datasets, the
anomalous probability score of attackers will be high and yield a high accuracy. In a real attack,
there is a high chance of an attacker to spoof the IP address so that the anomalous probability
score of that unknown IP will be close to zero which will reduce the accuracy of the system.
BOA [46] is widely being used by researchers for hyperparameter optimization and black-
box optimization [47]. In this method, an unknown objective function is mapped into a prior
belief and sequentially refined by a Bayesian posterior update [47]. Snoek et al. used BOA to
tune machine learning hyperparameters [48]. It is also used by Pooyan et al. to optimize the
performance of Apache Storm stream processor [49]. Among the population-based optimiza-
tion algorithms, Genetic Algorithm (GA) and PSO [50] are widely used for hyperparameter
tuning [51, 52]. GA and PSO optimized a selected set of problems with equal accuracy in
a test conducted by Hassan et al. [53]. Though GA has been successfully applied for opti-
mization problems, it is inefficient for applications with highly correlated parameters [52]. In
1A CEP operator used to filter events based on a given condition.
2A CEP operator used to subset events based on some conditions like a time frame or number of events per
window.
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addition, GA is much more complex to implement than PSO. Therefore, both BOA and PSO
are evaluated for suitability in this research due to their simplicity and popularity in similar
optimization problems.
Chapter 3
Problem Formulation
3.1 Map Intrusion Detection to Sequence Prediction
Seq2Seq model is widely being used in NMT [24, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. In general, a Seq2Seq
problem can be defined as below:
X = (x1, x2, x3, ...xn)
Y = (y1, y2, y3, ...ym)
Y ′ = (σs, y′1, y
′
2, y
′
3, ...y
′
m, σe)
Y ′i+1 = f (X,
i⋃
t=0
Y ′t )
where X is the input sequence which is the source sentence in NMT, and Y is the expected
output sequence which is the ideal translated sentence in NMT. σs is a flag indicating Start of
Sequence known as <S OS > in NMT and σe is a flag indicating End of Sequence known as
<EOS> in NMT. Y ′ is the input to the decoder which starts with σs and ends with σe. Naively,
y′i is the predicted item for the decoder input y
′
i−1. In teacher forcing method [54], yi−1 is used
as the decoder input to predict y′i . f is the Seq2Seq encoder-decoder model which generates
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the i + 1th item of output sequence using the input sequence X together with the first i elements
of decoder input Y ′.
The intrusion detection problem can be mapped to the Seq2Seq prediction problem by
defining a sequence of packets P as given below in which pi is the ith packet in the sequence.
The first k packets are used as input sequence X and the remaining packets are treated as output
sequence Y . Sequences with a prediction accuracy α less than a threshold T , are classified as
an anomaly.
P = (p1, p2, p3, ...pn)
X = (p1, p2, p3, ...pk)
Y = (pk+1, pk+2, ...pn)
Y ′ = (σs, p′k+1, p
′
k+2, ...p
′
n, σe)
α = 1 −
n∑
i=k+1
δ(pi, p′i)
Though the intrusion detection problem can be mapped to sequence prediction problem,
the traditional Seq2Seq algorithm cannot be directly applied for packet prediction. In NMT,
Seq2Seq model receives and generates sentences which are sequences of one-dimensional
items: words. A word can be encoded into a one-hot vector [55] with a size equal to the
number of words in the vocabulary. In intrusion detection problem, the model must receive
and generate a sequence of packets where a packet is a multidimensional item. Flattening all
selected attributes into a single one-hot vector requires a large vector and does not let the model
learn the contribution of each attributes in predicting the next packet. Therefore, a new map-
ping technique or a model to predict multidimensional sequence is required to apply Seq2Seq
model for intrusion detection.
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Figure 3.1: HTTP Slow Header DoS Detector – a Wisdom query to detect HTTP Slow Header
DoS attack based on the fact that the attacker opens several incomplete connections simultane-
ously to keep the server busy.
def stream PacketStream;
def stream AttackStream;
@config(trainable=true, minimum=100, maximum=60000, step=-1)
def variable time_threshold = 101;
@config(trainable=true, minimum=3, maximum=1000, step=1)
def variable count_threshold = 998;
from PacketStream
filter ‘http’ == app_protocol and
destPort == 80 and ‘\r\n\r\n’ in data
and ‘Keep-Alive: \\d+’ matches data
partition by destIp
window.externalTimeBatch(‘timestamp ’, $time_threshold)
aggregate count() as no_of_packets
filter no_of_packets >= $count_threshold
select srcIp, destIp, timestamp
insert into AttackStream;
3.2 Stream Processor Query Optimization
Logical stream processor queries are developed by domain experts using their experience
and domain knowledge. Several recent studies have proposed automatic CEP rule genera-
tion using unsupervised machine learning algorithms to replace domain experts by machines
[19, 20, 21, 22]. Machine learning algorithms require a lot of preprocessed data and training
time. Instead, the traditional way of defining CEP rules based on human cognition and domain-
specific facts is easier than mining rules from training data. For example, HTTP Slow Header
DoS attacks open several incomplete connections to keep an HTTP server busy for a long time
[56]. A “Wisdom” CEP rule was developed based on the above definition to detect HTTP Slow
Header DoS attack as given in Figure 3.1. Though it is easy to define the filter condition ( f ilter
keyword with boolean conditions in Figure 3.1) based on attack signature, determining thresh-
old values (time threshold and count threshold in Figure 3.1) requires manual inspection of
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training data. Humans are experts in logical reasoning using their experience and cognition but
poor in handling a large volume of numbers. Especially in intrusion detection, it is a tedious
task for a human to analyze raw pcap files and to determine those threshold values.
Threshold values in a CEP rule can be an integer, a real number or a constant. Considering
all possible constants as a list of candidates, they can be treated as integer values. These num-
bers may or may not have lower and upper bounds. For example, the minimum count threshold
in Figure 3.1 has a lower bound 0 but not an upper bound because the number of packets in an
interval can be an arbitrarily large positive number but cannot be a negative number. However,
these parameters are correlated to each other in such way that they cannot take all possible
values in the space. According to these facts, a CEP rule optimization problem can be defined
as
max/min f (x1, x2, x3, ..., xn)
s.t AX ≤ B
xR
where A is a rational matrix, and B is a rational vector. CEP rule is a discontinuous func-
tion which takes streams of events as input and optionally generates complex events as output.
Therefore, it is hard to fit a CEP rule itself in an optimization problem. Instead, f is a continu-
ous profit or loss function defined using the output of a CEP rule in such a way that optimizing f
will optimize the CEP rule. This way, optimizing a CEP rule can be defined as a Mixed Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) problem if f is linear or Mixed Integer Non-Linear Programming
(MINLP) problem if f is non-linear. Both MILP and MINLP are NP-Hard problems and as
such, finding a solution in polynomial time is not feasible in a worst-case scenario [57, 58].
Chapter 4
Methodology
The proposed IDS has two main components: (1) a machine learning model for anomaly-based
intrusion detection and (2) an adaptive stream processor for signature-based intrusion detection.
This section covers both these components and how the problems discussed in Chapter 3 have
been addressed in this research. In addition, the architecture of proposed IDS is explained in
this chapter.
4.1 Dataset Selection and Preprocessing
Available intrusion detection datasets such as DARPA 1999 [59], KDD CUP 1999 [60], UNSW-
NB15 [61] and CICIDS 2017 come with raw packet capture files and pre-processed data in text
or CSV format. Pre-processed datasets in human readable format do not capture the sequential
relationship of packets. For example, the KDD CUP 1999 dataset has 42 attributes but among
them, the duration of a connection and the number o f connections in the last two seconds are
the only two attributes related to the temporal relationship of packets. Still, KDD CUP 1999
dataset does not provide any hint on packets which are part of each connection and how those
packets are aligned in the connection. Therefore, raw network packets1 were used to train
1The application developed to process raw packet capture files is available at https://github.com/
slgobinath/pcap-processor
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the MSeq2MSeq machine learning model. In Phase 1 evaluation, the model was trained and
tested using raw packets from DARPA 1999 dataset. However, the simulated traffic in DARPA
1999 dataset is highly unrealistic. For example, manual inspection of raw packets revealed
that some port scans were generated by iterating from port 1 to 1000 five times repetitively. In
addition, DARPA 1999 dataset is more than fifteen years old. On the other hand, CICIDS 2017
dataset is relatively newer than other datasets and covers the most common attacks based on
2016 McAfee report [32]. Therefore, raw packet capture files from CICIDS 2017 dataset were
chosen to train and test the IDS due to the availability of recent attacks in raw packet capture
format.
In the Phase 1 evaluation using DARPA 1999 dataset, a sequence of packets P was defined
as a TCP connection. However, it cannot be used with other connectionless protocols like
User Datagram Protocol (UDP). Therefore, in later evaluations, streams of packets transferred
between the same client and server were split into sequences Pi as given below:
Pi = (pi1 , pi2 , pi3 , ...pin)
s.t T IME(p(i+1)1) − T IME(pin) ≥ 1sec
and T IME(pit+1) − T IME(pit) < 1sec
and IP(pit+1) ≡ IP(pit)
where pik is the k
th packet in the ith sequence, T IME is the timestamp of the packet, and IP is
the hostname of the source or destination. Here an assumption was made that most of the time,
network traffic is generated directly or indirectly by humans. Therefore, a delay is expected
between two independent traffic generated by a person. For example, if a user clicks on a link,
there will be a delay before another click. In such a case, packets transferred for the first click
and the second click are treated as two separate sequences. In this research, a 1sec delay was
considered which was determined by trial and error using CICIDS 2017 dataset. Suppose a user
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watches more than a video from the same server, all the packets transmitted between the client
and server may be considered as a sequence because of the lack of significant delay between
those packets. No actions were taken to separate them because it is a legitimate scenario and
the model should be able to learn such patterns.
Splitting DARPA 1999 dataset based on the above definition led to sequences with packets
from several independent connections. It may be due to the way DARPA 1999 dataset was
created using continuously repeating scripts without concerning real human behavior. A model
trained using such a dataset will fail to differentiate the traffic generated by bots from legitimate
traffic. Compared to DARPA 1999, CICIDS 2017 is better in representing human behavior.
However, CICIDS 2017 dataset also has some pitfalls. For example, the creators of the dataset
claim that there are 21 SQL Injection attacks in the dataset; but only 15 packets related to SQL
Injection attack were found in the packet capture file. CICIDS 2017 dataset has only one long-
running simulation of every selected attack. Since the proposed IDS processes raw packets, the
labeled dataset cannot be used to compare the number of detections. Instead, the timestamp
and IP addresses of anomalous packets detected by the IDS were manually compared with raw
packets and labeled dataset to confirm the accuracy.
Bucket Protocol No of packets Encoder Input Decoder Input
1 TCP 4-10 3 7
2 TCP 11-20 7 13
3 TCP 21-40 13 27
4 TCP 41-80 27 53
5 TCP 81-160 53 107
6 TCP 161-320 107 213
7 UDP 4-10 3 7
8 UDP 11-20 7 13
9 UDP 21-40 13 27
Table 4.1: Buckets of Sequences – sequences grouped based on transport protocol and the
maximum number of packets per sequence. Sequences with less than 3 packets were ignored
and sequences with more than 320 packets were pruned to 320.
Packets from the first day of CICIDS 2017 dataset which contain attack free traffic were
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split into sequences. In an initial experiment with CICIDS 2017 dataset, a single model was
unable to learn all sequences with enough accuracy. Therefore, the extracted sequences were
grouped into buckets based on transport protocol and the maximum number of packets as
shown in Table 4.1 and dedicated MSeq2MSeq models were developed for each bucket. Us-
ing different models per transport protocol lets each model learn a single pattern. Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets were ignored because the dataset does not have
enough number of ICMP sequences to train the machine learning model. Sequences with
less than the maximum number of packets of a bucket were padded with max bucket size −
sequence length number of EMPTY PACKET s to meet the expected length of the input vec-
tor. Here, EMPTY PACKET is a vector representing a packet with default values assigned to
each selected attributes. Sequences with less than four packets were ignored because the en-
coder required at least three to predict with enough accuracy in our preliminary test. Sequences
having more than 320 TCP packets were pruned to 320, and more than 160 UDP packets were
pruned to 160 because there were no enough TCP sequences with more than 320 packets and
UDP sequences with more than 160 packets to train a model with enough accuracy. From
each packet, following attributes were selected to be used with the proposed machine learning
model: transport layer, src ip, dst ip, ip f lag, transport f lag. Increasing the number of
selected attributes reduces the accuracy of the model. Above attributes were selected by trial
and error to obtain better accuracy.
4.2 Sequence to Sequence Model
Seq2Seq model has two RNN’s named encoder and decoder. The goal of the encoder is con-
verting an input sequence X = (x1, . . . , xn), into a vector c and the goal of the decoder is
converting c into an output sequence Y = (y1, . . . , yn).
At each time step t, hidden state of an RNN ht is computed by (4.1) where f is a non-linear
activation function and xt is the input at time t.
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ht = f (xt, ht−1) (4.1)
Usually the non-linear activation function f is an LSTM and c is the final hidden state hn
of that LSTM. Decoder is another LSTM which generates Y = (yt, ..., yi) using Y = (y1, ..., yt−1)
as the input and c as the initial internal state. Hidden state of the decoder is computed by:
ht = f (ht−1,Yt−1, c) (4.2)
4.3 Multidimensional Sequence to Multidimensional Sequence
Model
Though Seq2Seq model is widely being used in NMT, it cannot receive or generate sequences
with multidimensional items as discussed in Chapter 3.1. Therefore the traditional Seq2Seq
model is improved in this research to receive and generate sequences with multidimensional
items as depicted in Figure 4.1. This figure depicts only a single layer of sigmoid func-
tions. However, there may be more than one layer depending on the problem. The proposed
MSeq2MSeq model has k number of input and output branches where k is the number of se-
lected attributes in a packet. Depending on the problem, the number of branches of the encoder
and decoder can vary. This way, MSeq2MSeq model learns the contribution of every single
attribute in predicting the next packet and adjusts the weight in input and output branches. Ex-
cept for the first few layers and last few layers, the model reflects the exact traditional Seq2Seq
model. The attention layer proposed by Luong et al. [38] is used to obtain better results as
discussed later in this chapter.
Sutskever et al. and Luong et al. obtained better results by reversing the encoder input in
NMT. The impact of reversing input sequence in packet prediction was tested by comparing the
training loss of reversed and non-reversed encoder input. Though there was no significant dif-
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Figure 4.1: Multidimensional Sequence to Multidimensional Sequence Model - an en-
hanced Seq2Seq model to receive and generate sequences of multidimensional items. This
model learns the individual contribution of each attribute of elements in predicting the se-
quence.
ference in prediction accuracy and training loss, the model trained with direct input sequences
learned slightly better than the model trained with reversed input sequence as shown in Figure
4.2. As shown in Table 4.1, the encoder input sequence X is always guaranteed to be complete.
Furthermore, in a sequence of packets, the i + 1th packet is highly depending on ith packet than
the first packet. Therefore, reversing the encoder input is not necessary in packet prediction
problem.
The impact of attention layer in the proposed MSeq2MSeq model for packet prediction
was tested using the attention layer proposed by Luong et al. Two MSeq2MSeq models were
developed with and without the attention layer proposed by Luong et al. and trained using
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Figure 4.2: Impact of Reversing Encoder Input – comparison of the impact of reversing
encoder input in (a) Bucket 1 (b) and Bucket 3 from Table 4.1. The model trained with not-
reversed sequences with a maximum of 10 TCP packets learned slightly faster than the model
trained with reversed sequences with a maximum of 10 TCP packets. As the number of packets
in a sequence increases, the difference becomes less transparent.
sequences from “Bucket 1” and “Bucket 3” respectively. As shown in Figure 4.3, the model
with attention layer learned faster than the model without attention layer while training se-
quences from “Bucket 1”. However, there is no significant difference in training the model
with sequences from “Bucket 3”. Sequences in “Bucket 1” has a maximum of ten packets and
sequences in “Bucket 3” has a maximum of 40 packets. Packets from a small network connec-
tion like TCP three-way handshake heavily rely on preceding packets compared to packets in a
long network connection like video streaming. As discussed earlier, the definition of sequence
allows a sequence to have packets from more than one connection. As the number of packets in
a sequence increases, there is a high chance of having packets from different network connec-
tions. Therefore, as the number of packets increases, the importance of reversing the encoder
input or having an attention layer becomes less.
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Figure 4.3: Impact of Attention Layer – comparison of the impact of attention layer in (a)
Bucket 1 (b) and Bucket 3 from Table 4.1. The model with attention-layer learned significantly
faster than the model without attention layer when training them using sequences with a max-
imum of 10 TCP packets. As the number of packets in a sequence increases, the difference
becomes less transparent.
4.4 Wisdom Stream Processor
Even though dynamic stream processors have been proposed in early works, commercial stream
processors do not support dynamic query modification at the runtime. Analysing the open
source stream processors: Apache Flink and WSO2 Siddhi revealed that their underlying data
structures that are being used to store events in memory do not support dynamic query mod-
ification. On the other hand, authors of iCEP dynamic complex event processor claim that
their complex event processor can analyze “thousands of events in a few minutes” [20] which
is much less than the throughput of commercial stream processors which typically can handle
several million events per second. Therefore, an adaptable and functionally auto-scaling stream
processor: “Wisdom”2 was developed without compromising the performance [27]. The un-
derlying architecture of “Wisdom” using Observer design pattern and Mediator design pattern
[62] to implement variables and dynamic CEP operators yields performance comparable to
commercial stream processors as shown in Table 4.2 and significantly better performance than
2The Wisdom Stream Processor is available at https://slgobinath.github.io/wisdom
30 Chapter 4. Methodology
20
0
20
40
60
80 100
125
150
175
200
225
250
275
300
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Figure 4.4: Made-up Profit Function – representing an imaginary CEP rule with two thresh-
old values to test Bayesian Optimization and Particle Swarm Optimization algorithms. The
imaginary CEP rule produces more accurate events when those threshold values are close to
20 and 200.
iCEP.
Stream Processor Throughput Latency
Apache Flink 6,711,544 events/sec 100 nanoseconds
WSO2 Siddhi 3,811,876 events/sec 216 nanoseconds
Wisdom 2,543,299 events/sec 332 nanoseconds
Esper 2,247,807 events/sec 334 nanoseconds
Table 4.2: Performance Comparison of Stream Processors – comparing “Wisdom” with
commercial stream processors using a filter query in single thread setup.
The profit or loss function f defined in Chapter 3.2 is a black box of correlated variables
because its output depends on the underlying CEP rule. CEP rules looking for anomalies emit
output only for a limited set of threshold values. For any other values, they emit nothing. A
simple profit function was developed as shown in Figure 4.4 to simulate the behavior of an
imaginary CEP rule which generates output only if its threshold values are closed to 20 and
200. Both PSO and BOA were used to optimize this function. The accuracy and execution
time were recorded for each optimization algorithms. As shown in Table 4.3, PSO outperforms
BOA in both accuracy and performance. PSO starts with random initial points and quickly
converges to the optimum once a particle finds an improvement in the profit. Though BOA had
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Figure 4.5: CEP Rule Optimization Algorithm – a hybrid optimization algorithm developed
using PSO and Bisection algorithms. PSO algorithm is used to find an initial optimum point
and Bisection algorithm is used to push the optimum point towards a desired boundary.
Input: f unction, constraints, steps
Output: optimal values
1: optimal values, loss← PS O( f unction, constraints)
2: for all val ∈ optimal values do
3: val← Bisection( f unction, val,
constraints[val], step[val])
4: end for
5: return optimal values
some initial points close to the optimum, it was distracted by the plateau where profit is 0 and
spent more time in building the prior model. Therefore, the PSO algorithm has been chosen to
implement the actual CEP parameter tuning algorithm.
Bayesian Particle Swarm
Initial points/Swarm size 100 100
Maximum iterations 10 10
Avg. execution time (seconds) 255.788 0.029
Avg. optimal points (x, y) 8.742, 409.921 20.681, 199.919
Avg. Profit 0 0.998
Table 4.3: Bayesian Optimization vs Particle Swarm Optimization – comparison of
Bayesian and Particle Swarm optimization algorithms using the profit function shown in Figure
4.4. The maximum obtainable profit is 1 for the optimum point (20, 200).
A real CEP rule can have more than one optimum points adjacent to each other. For ex-
ample, the above imaginary CEP rule may produce the same output for threshold values in
between 20 − 25 and 200 − 250. Depending on the requirement we may be interested in either
the upper bound or the lower bound of a threshold. For example, we prefer to have minimum
time threshold and maximum count threshold for the CEP rule given in Figure 3.1 to reduce
latency and false positives. Therefore, a hybrid optimization algorithm was implemented using
PSO and Bisection algorithms as shown in Figure 4.5. PSO is used to find the initial optimum
values, and Bisection algorithm is used to push them towards desired boundaries. In traditional
Bisection algorithm, the convergence speed reduces with every iteration as the step size de-
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Figure 4.6: Wisdom Optimizer Architecture – a framework developed to optimize Wisdom
rules. The Input Feeder and Loss Function must be defined by the user depending on the
requirement and data format.
creases. To overcome this problem, the user-defined step value (−1 and 1 in Figure 3.1) is used
as the step size if the actual step size is smaller than the user-defined step value. Sign of the
user-defined step value indicates the desired direction to move the optimum threshold values.
The proposed optimization algorithm requires a domain expert to limit the range of thresh-
old variables to find a solution in polynomial time. The minimum value, maximum value, and
step size are tailored to “Wisdom” query using @con f ig(trainable = true, ...) annotation as
shown in Figure 3.1. Figure 4.6 depicts the architecture of Wisdom Optimizer. In this archi-
tecture, “Input Feeder” and “Loss Function” must be defined by domain experts depending on
the domain requirements where “Input Feeder” feeds input events to the optimizer and “Loss
Function” converts the output of CEP rule to a real number. “Wisdom Application” is the
runtime environment compiled from a Wisdom query and the “Optimization Algorithm” is the
implementation of the algorithm given in Figure 4.5 with additional features to coordinate with
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Figure 4.7: Wisdom Java API – a sample Wisdom application developed using Java API to
filter TCP packets from PacketStream.
WisdomApp app = new WisdomApp("TCPFilter", "1.0.0")
app.defineStream("PacketStream");
app.defineStream("OutputStream");
app.defineQuery("FilterQuery")
.from("PacketStream")
.filter(event -> "TCP".equals(event.get("protocol")))
.insertInto("OutputStream");
app.addCallback("OutputStream", EventPrinter::print);
Figure 4.8: Wisdom Query – a sample Wisdom application developed using Wisdom Query
Language to filter TCP packets from PacketStream.
@app(name=‘TCPFilter ’, version=‘1.0.0’)
def stream PacketStream;
@sink(type=‘console ’)
def stream OutputStream;
@query(name=‘FilterQuery ’)
from PacketStream
filter symbol == ‘TCP’
insert into OutputStream;
“Wisdom” application.
“Wisdom” provides Java [63] API and Wisdom Query Language to develop CEP applica-
tions. For example, Figure 4.7 shows a Wisdom application developed in Java to filter TCP
packets from PacketS tream. The same application can be developed using Wisdom Query
Language as given in Figure 4.8. A rule defined using Wisdom Query Language can be still
parsed in Java to create a Java based application. Wisdom Stream Processor package provides
the necessary infrastructure to run “Wisdom” applications as a service using query files. Even
though “Wisdom” can be used as a Java library, running “Wisdom” application as a service is
recommended for scalability and resource allocation. The Wisdom Stream Processor package
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also provides an additional tool named “Wisdom Manager” which can be used to automati-
cally deploy and control Wisdom rules. Currently, Wisdom Manager supports the following
RESTful APIs:
• Get details about a deployed Wisdom rule.
• Get details about all deployed Wisdom rules.
• Start a deployed Wisdom rule.
• Stop a running Wisdom rule.
• Stop the Wisdom Manager.
These APIs are subject to change in future work according to the requirement. Wisdom
Query Language provides built-in semantics to define the priority of a query within the system
and streams on which the query is depending on. A stream defined in a query can report its
statistics to third parties including Wisdom Manager. Using these details, Wisdom Manager
can automatically stop running Wisdom instances if streams on which they are depending on
have not received any events for a long time. However, functionally auto-scaling deployment
is an optional feature and only used in the IDS if system resources are limited. Distributing
and scaling a stream processor at the operator level can cause to coordination problems in CEP
operators depending on the order of events. Therefore, “Wisdom” stream processor is designed
using microservice architecture [31] to deploy each CEP rule as a microservice with required
memory and CPU allocation.
4.5 Integrating the Stream Processor with Machine Learner
Another framework named “Wisdom Machine Learner”3 is developed using TensorFlow [64]
to train and serve the MSeq2MSeq model developed in Chapter 4.3. The framework is config-
urable to pre-process, train, test or serve the MSeq2MSeq model in a pipeline. The Wisdom
3The Wisdom Machine Learner is available at https://github.com/slgobinath/wisdom-ml
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Figure 4.9: Wisdom Stream Processor and Machine Learner – integrating the Wisdom
Machine Learner into a Wisdom application. The gRPC Mapper seamlessly sends events to
the Wisdom Machine Learner and injects the result back into the stream of events.
Machine Learner exposes gRPC [28] endpoint which can be accessed from “Wisdom” stream
processor through gRPC Mapper as given in Figure 4.9. The predictive “Wisdom” query given
in Figure 4.10 splits the stream of packets transferred between same source and destination,
aligns them into a sequence using IdleLengthT imeBatchWindow4 and seamlessly calculates
the prediction accuracy using the Wisdom Machine Learner. The Wisdom Machine Learner
converts the events to a one-hot vector, calculates the prediction accuracy using TensorFlow
Model Server, and returns the accuracy to the stream processor. The above query is also re-
sponsible for selecting the correct endpoint according to the maximum number of packets in
the sequence. During runtime, this query is served using three independent services: (1) Wis-
dom Stream Processor, (2) Wisdom Machine Learner, and (3) TensorFlow Model Server. Since
they are independent of each other, these instances can be scaled up and down depending on
the requirement.
4.6 Intrusion Detection System
The proposed IDS combines both adaptive intrusion detection and functionally auto-scaling
deployment together as depicted in Figure 4.11. Even though only raw network packets were
used in this research, CEP rules can be written to take advantage of other sources like applica-
tion logs and company policy changes. Every individual “Wisdom” service running as part of
4A CEP window which collects events from a stream and emits them if there is an idle period in the stream or
the number of events in the window exceeds a threshold.
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Figure 4.10: Predictive Wisdom Query – detects anomalies using Wisdom Machine Learner
serving on localhost port 9001. Sequences with a prediction accuracy less than 0.125 are
classified as anomalies.
@app(name=‘WisdomApp ’, version=‘1.0.0’, playback=‘timestamp ’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9000’)
def stream PacketStream;
def stream TCPStream;
@source(type=‘console ’)
def stream AttackStream;
from PacketStream
filter transport_layer == ‘\ac{tcp}’
select src_ip, dst_ip, ip_flag
partition by src_ip, dst_ip
window.idleTimeLengthBatch(time.sec(1), 1000)
limit 320
aggregate collect(‘src_ip ’) as src_ip, collect(‘dst_ip ’) as dst_ip,
collect(‘ip_flag ’) as ip_flag
map len(‘ip_flag ’) as no_of_packets
insert into TCPStream;
from TCPStream
filter no_of_packets > 20 and no_of_packets <= 40
map grpc(‘localhost:9001’, ‘accuracy ’) as accuracy
filter accuracy < 0.125
select src_ip, dst_ip, no_of_packets , accuracy
insert into AttackStream;
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the IDS has the flexibility to read external sources and to produce output to external endpoints.
Therefore, users can write individual rules using different sources of events without worrying
about other rules already deployed in the IDS. However, a common source is recommended
for inputs which are likely to be used by all “Wisdom” rules to improve the performance. For
example, in the above architecture, the “Filter Query” receives all network packets and share
them with other “Wisdom” rules. The deployment method of “Wisdom” rules in the proposed
IDS differs from native “Wisdom” stream processor. Both anomaly-based rules and untunable
signature-based rules are deployed as normal CEP rules. However, signature-based rules with
tunable parameters are deployed in Minimum Rate Guaranteed mode. Since the IDS is devel-
oped using “Wisdom” stream processor, it takes all advantages of “Wisdom” stream processor
including self-tuning rules, functionally auto-scaling instances in a distributed deployment,
SQL like “Wisdom” query for rule definition and multiple input sources for advanced decision
making. Following sections cover the in-depth architecture of adaptive IDS and functionally
auto-scaling IDS.
4.6.1 Adaptive Intrusion Detection System
The intrusion detection system is built using both “Wisdom” stream processor and Wisdom
Machine Learner. During deployment time, IDS reads all “Wisdom” rules and create “Wis-
dom” instances based on those rules. If a query has at least one trainable variable, the IDS will
create three runtime instances of the query: (1) a static instance which will use user-defined
thresholds forever, (2) an adaptive instance starting with user-defined thresholds but will be
tuned later by the IDS and (3) a sandboxed instance to optimize the query without producing
output to the user. If a query does not have trainable variables, only one CEP instance will
be created. Predictive “Wisdom” rules connected with machine learner also can be tunable.
However, in this research, predictive rules were not tuned to reduce complexity and resource
consumption.
As shown in Figure 4.12, the “Packet Receiver” receives raw packets, converts them into
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Figure 4.11: Intrusion Detection System – a high-level architecture of the adaptive and func-
tionally auto-scaling IDS developed using Wisdom Stream Processor and MSeq2MSeq model.
events and feeds them to the “Packet Cache” and all deployed “Wisdom” applications. A
“Wisdom” application can be a signature-based detector as in Figure 3.1 or an anomaly-based
detector with the support of “Wisdom” machine learner as in Figure 4.10. “Packet Cache”
keeps packets arrived in last t minutes which will be later used to tune “Wisdom” rules. Alerts
generated by “Wisdom” applications trigger the Wisdom Optimizer deployed in a sandbox and
update the threshold variables of “Wisdom” applications. Missing an attack can cause severe
damage in safety-critical domains like intrusion detection. The above Minimum Rate Guar-
anteed deployment ensures that the IDS will not miss any attacks that could be captured by
the user-defined rule by tuning a clone of CEP rule and running both user-defined rule and
self-tuning rule concurrently with a cost of additional system resources. Running duplicate
instances of the same Wisdom rule generates duplicate alerts for the same attack. Such dupli-
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Figure 4.12: Self-tuning Intrusion Detection System - the Minimum Rate Guaranteed de-
ployment of self-tuning Wisdom rules. Two additional clones of tunable rules are used to
optimize the rule in a sandbox and to guarantee the minimum detection rate.
cate alerts are filtered by the “Alert Manager”. It is also responsible for triggering the relevant
Wisdom Optimizer to tune the rule. By combining stream processor and machine learner, the
IDS can detect attacks based on both signature and anomalous traffic.
4.6.2 Functionally Auto-scaling Intrusion Detection System
In an IDS, some attack detectors may need more resources than others. For example, a DoS
attack detector may need more system resources than an SQL attack detector due to the large
amount of traffic involved in DoS attack. The native microservice architecture of “Wisdom”
stream processor lets the IDS to control system resource allocation per each IDS rule. Running
all intrusion detectors all the time consumes a lot of system resources. In the world of IoT,
miniature computers like Raspberry Pi [65] are getting popular. In such systems, running a
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Figure 4.13: Filter Query Used in Functionally Auto-scaling Deployment – filters network
packets based on some initial conditions and to send them to relevant possible attack stream.
@app(name=‘packet_filter ’, version=‘1.0.0’, priority=10, stats=‘
StatisticsStream ’, stats_freq=time.sec(5), stats_vars=[’port’])
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9092’, topic=‘
PacketStream ’)
def stream PacketStream;
@config(stats=true)
@sink(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9092’, topic=‘
PossibleDosStream ’)
def stream PossibleDosStream;
@config(stats=true)
@sink(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9092’, topic=‘
PossibleBruteForceStream ’)
def stream PossibleBruteForceStream;
@config(stats=true)
@sink(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9092’, topic=‘
PossiblePortScanStream ’)
def stream PossiblePortScanStream;
@sink(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9092’, topic=‘_Statistics ’)
def stream StatisticsStream;
@query(name=‘FilterDosAttacks ’)
from PacketStream
filter ‘http’ == app_protocol and destPort == 80 and ‘\r\n\r\n’ in
data and ‘Keep-Alive: \\d+’ in data
insert into PossibleDosStream;
@query(name=‘FilterBruteForceAttacks ’)
from PacketStream
filter ‘\ac{ftp}[Control]’ == app_protocol and ‘530 Login incorrect ’
in data
insert into PossibleBruteForceStream;
@query(name=‘FilterPortScanAttacks ’)
from PacketStream
filter syn == true and ack == false
insert into PossiblePortScanStream;
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Figure 4.14: DoS Attack Detector Used in Functionally Auto-scaling Deployment – uses
packets filtered by “packet filter” shown in Figure 4.13. This query is depending on ‘Possible-
DosStream’. Therefore, it will not run until ‘PossibleDosStream’ receive some events.
@app(name=‘dos_detector ’, version=‘1.0.0’, priority=5, requires=[‘
PossibleDosStream ’])
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9092’, topic=‘
PossibleDosStream ’)
def stream PossibleDosStream;
@sink(type=‘file.text’, path=‘/temp/dos.txt’)
def stream DosAttackStream;
from PossibleDosStream
partition by destIp
window.externalTimeBatch(‘timestamp ’, 1189)
aggregate count() as no_of_packets
filter no_of_packets >= 3
select srcIp, destIp, no_of_packets , timestamp
insert into DosAttackStream;
full-fledged IDS is not feasible. Therefore, the proposed IDS is designed to start or stop its
rules using the advantage of functionally auto-scaling “Wisdom” stream processor.
Functionally Auto-scaling IDS always requires a query to filter events as given in Figure
4.13. The above query reads packets from Apache Kafka message queue. Even though the
input source can be configured to any other supported sources in “Wisdom” stream processor,
Apache Kafka or any other message queues are recommended to handle unexpected unavail-
ability of “Wisdom” instances. This query filters the packets and inserts them into different
streams if they meet certain conditions. The priority = 10 property in @app annotation
informs the “Wisdom Manager” that the “packet filter” query should not be stopped by any
chance.
Output streams of “packet filter” are used for further processing in separate “Wisdom”
queries. For example, the “dos detector” given in Figure 4.14 collects filtered packets from
“packet filter” through PossibleDosS tream and process them further to detect HTTP Slow
Header DoS attack. The priority = 5 and requires = [′PossibleDosS tream′] properties in
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@app annotation informs the “Wisdom Manager” that the “dos detector” query should not
run unless there are some events passed to the PossibleDosS tream. Wisdom Manager keeps
looking at the throughput of each stream decorated with @con f ig(stats = true) (See Figure
4.13) and starts all depending queries if a stream has a throughput greater than a predefined
threshold τ which is 0 in the proposed IDS. If a stream has a throughput of 0 for a long time,
the Wisdom Manager will stop all depending “Wisdom” instances with a priority less than a
predefined threshold Θ to save system resources. In this method, latency is compromised for
resource utilization because starting a new “Wisdom” instance takes some time. However, the
system will not miss any packets since they are written to and read from Apache Kafka queue.
Chapter 5
Evaluation
The proposed IDS was evaluated in three phases: (1) to ensure the applicability of the MSeq2MSeq
model in intrusion detection using DARPA 1999 dataset, (2) to test all components of the IDS
using CICIDS 2017 dataset, and (3) to test the effectiveness of functionally auto-scaling de-
ployment. First two evaluation phases have three tests per each and the last phase has a single
test. This chapter covers all test case setups and their purpose. Results obtained for each test
are discussed in Chapter 6.
5.1 Phase 1 - Test the MSeq2MSeq model using DARPA 1999
dataset
Phase 1 tests were developed to ensure that the MSeq2MSeq model can be used for real-time
intrusion detection by treating streams of packets as sequences. As discussed in Chapter 1,
Bontemps et al. used stacked LSTM RNN model for intrusion detection in DARPA 1999
dataset based on sequential anomaly detection. Results obtained in this evaluation phase are
compared with the results obtained by Bontemps et al.
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TCP packets from attack-free outside sniffing data of DARPA 1999 dataset were split into
connections based on their sessions using PcapSplitter.1 Connections with less than 4 pack-
ets were not used for training and connections with more than 60 packets were pruned to 60
because a connection must have at least 4 packets to train the model and 96.96% TCP connec-
tions in the training dataset have less than 60 packets. Connections having packets between 3
and 60, were padded with empty packets to maintain desired batch input format. The first three
packets of a connection were used as input sequence to predict the rest.
The decoder was trained to predict {p4, p5, . . . , pn, σe} using {σs, p4, p5, . . . , pn} as input
and hidden state of the encoder as the initial state. Here, n is the number of packets in the
connection. The model was trained using Teacher Forcing [54] because it reduces error propa-
gation in testing. Even if the model can predict more than one upcoming packets, it must wait
for actual packets to calculate the prediction error. Therefore, predicting i + 1th packet after the
arrival of ith packet is enough and gives better results.
Three datasets were prepared from the DARPA 1999 dataset: (1) attack-free tcpdumps split
into connections; (2) tcpdumps containing both attack and normal traffic within a day; and (3)
tcpdumps containing both attack and normal traffic over a week.
5.1.1 Test 1.1 - Validate the MSeq2MSeq model using legitimate TCP
connections
The first dataset was used to check the accuracy of the model on predicting packets of normal
TCP connections and end of connections (σe) with a goal of validating the model. For this test,
the first three packets of valid TCP connections were fed to the encoder and the rest were fed to
the decoder one by one to predict following packets. Two packets were considered equal only
if all their attributes match to each other. The accuracy of a predicted connection is calculated
by (5.1).
1PcapPlusPlus available at https://github.com/seladb/PcapPlusPlus
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accuracy =
No o f correct predictions
No o f packets in connection
∗ 100 (5.1)
5.1.2 Test 1.2 - Determine the minimum accuracy threshold
TCP packets collected on Thursday of the second week outside sniffing data were split into
streams having requests and responses between same source and destination. The first three
packets from each stream were fed to the encoder and the rest were fed to the decoder one by
one to predict the next packet until the decoder generates a σe. Suppose a σe is generated after
ith packet in a stream, the first i packets will be considered as a connection and compared with
predicted packets. The remaining packets in the stream will be used to predict next connection.
If a σe is not generated within τ packets, the decoder will emit predicted τ number of packets
as a connection and a new prediction cycle will start from τ + 1th packet. Even though most
connections have less than 60 packets, τ is set to 100 in this test to be on the safe side.
In preliminary Test 1.2, the accuracy defined using exact match of packets resulted in more
false positives. Therefore, predicted packets were compared with actual packets using a dis-
tance algorithm as given in Figure 5.1. The distance algorithm calculates a weighted distance
by comparing individual categorical attributes of packets. The weight of each attribute is deter-
mined based on preliminary observations. The computed distance of each connection was used
to define the accuracy of prediction. Suppose a predicted connection has n packets, prediction
accuracy of that connection is given by (5.2).
accuracy =
n∑
i=1
1 − distancei
n
∗ 100 (5.2)
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Figure 5.1: Weighted Packet Distance Algorithm – used in Test 1.2 to calculate prediction
accuracy.
Input: actual packet, predicted packet,weights
Output: distance
Initialize:
1: distance← 0
2: for all name ∈ actual packet.attributes do
3: if (actual packet[name] , actual packet[name]) then
4: distance← distance + weights[name]
5: end if
6: end for
7: distance← distance/∑weights
8: return distance
5.1.3 Test 1.3 - Test the ability of the MSeq2MSeq model in real-time
intrusion detection
Test 1.3 was developed to validate the application of the proposed model in real-time anomaly
detection. Packets collected in the second week of DARPA 1999 dataset were preprocessed in
the same way as in Test 1.2 and fed to the model. The system will raise an alarm in real-time,
if the average weighted prediction error of 60 packets is less than 12.5% which is the mean
accuracy of anomalous packets in Test 2. The percentage of true positive alarms and number
of false positive alarms were compared with the results obtained by Bontemps et al. using
stacked LSTM RNN on the same dataset.
5.2 Phase 2 - Test the Intrusion Detection System using CI-
CIDS 2017 dataset
The MSeq2MSeq model trained on attack-free raw packets from CICIDS 2017 dataset as ex-
plained in Chapter 4 is used in this evaluation phase. Three tests were developed (1) to validate
the MSeq2MSeq model and to test the integration of stream processor with the machine learner,
(2) to compare the proposed CEP rule optimization algorithm with Turchin et al.’s work [18],
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and (3) to test the ability of the proposed IDS in detecting attacks based on both anomaly and
signature.
5.2.1 Test 2.1 - Test the integration of Wisdom Stream Processor with
Machine Learning model
In the training phase, MSeq2MSeq model was trained without the intervention of stream pro-
cessor to avoid additional delay introduced by the stream processor even though it is negli-
gible. All nine MSeq2MSeq models were trained and validated individually. Test 2.1 was
developed to test the integration of stream processor and all trained MSeq2MSeq models to
detect anomaly-based attacks. Predictive “Wisdom” rules were developed as in Figure 4.10
for all buckets listed in Table 4.1 and attack free stream of packets were fed to those rules.
As shown in Figure 4.10, predictive rules classify sequences with a prediction accuracy less
than 12.5% as anomalies. The minimum accuracy threshold was selected from Test 1.2. All
sequences classified as anomalies must be false positives in this test because the input traffic
does not have any attack.
5.2.2 Test 2.2 - Test the self-tuning ability of Wisdom Stream Processor
In Test 2.2, three “Wisdom” rules were developed to detect HTTP Slow Header DoS attack,
FTP brute force attack and “nmap -sS” Port scan probe. All these rules have two optimizable
variables: time threshold and count threshold. A loss function as given in Figure 5.2 was
developed to calculate the loss based on the number of false positive packets detected by stream
processor. In the five days period of CICIDS 2017 dataset, FTP brute force, HTTP Slow Header
DoS and Port scan attacks were simulated on Tuesday 9:20 - 10:20, Wednesday 10:14 - 10:35
and Friday 13:55 - 14:35, respectively. Packets transferred in a randomly selected 10 minutes
interval from those attack simulations were extracted and used to optimize the “Wisdom” rules.
After optimization, network packets from Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday packet capture files
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Figure 5.2: Loss Function to Tune “Wisdom” Rules – used in the proposed Intrusion Detec-
tion System. This function increases the loss by 100 for every false positive and decreases the
loss by 10 for every true positive to reduce the number of false positives.
Input: output events, exp src ip
Output: loss
Initialize:
1: loss← 1, 000, 000
2: for all event ∈ output events do
3: if exp src ip , event[‘src ip′] then
4: loss += event[‘no o f packets′] ∗ 100
5: else
6: loss −= event[‘no o f packets′] ∗ 10
7: end if
8: end for
9: return loss
were fed to FTP brute force, HTTP Slow Header DoS and Port scan detectors respectively.
5.2.3 Test 2.3 - Test the complete Intrusion Detection System using CI-
CIDS 2017 dataset
In Test 2.3, all queries developed in Test 2.1 and Test 2.2 were deployed together as depicted in
Figure 5.3 to detect attacks based on both anomalies and signature. Another rule to detect SQL
Injection based on the signature was developed without any variables to optimize. A filter to the
anomaly-based “Wisdom” rules was added to ignore Transport Layer Security (TLS) packets
since they caused false alarms in Test 2.1. Signature-based queries were deployed in self-tuning
mode with initial threshold values obtained in Test 2.2. Even though the IDS is supposed to
generate unique alert per attack, in this test the IDS was set to log all alerts to compare the pre-
cision of each component. The IDS groups packets into a sequence in anomaly-based detection
or into a group of packets collected by the IdleLengthT imeBatchWindow in signature-based
detection and classify them as anomaly or not. The labeled CICIDS 2017 dataset has f low of
packets marked as an attack or not but the definition of a f low is not available to the public.
Furthermore, the complete dataset was used in this test which makes counting packets involved
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Figure 5.3: Test 2.3 Deployment – signature-based rules and anomaly-based rules deployed
together in the IDS.
in attacks impossible. Therefore, the accuracy of the IDS was measured only in precision by
manually comparing packets classified as anomalies with raw packets. Every attack simulated
in the CICIDS 2017 dataset occurs only once but last for a long time. Therefore, detecting at
least one anomalous sequence which is part of an attack is enough for an IDS to prevent the
attack.
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5.3 Phase 3 - Test the functionally auto-scaling ability of Wis-
dom Stream Processor
5.3.1 Test 3.1 - Compare the memory consumption of functionally auto-
scaling deployment with manual deployment
Test 3.1 was developed to show the effectiveness of functionally auto-scaling stream processor
in intrusion detection. To avoid the complexity, only the signature-based rules developed in
Test 2.2 were used without enabling self-tuning ability. Deploying all three signature-based
rules requires three “Wisdom” instances to run all the time. Instead, a filter query as given in
Figure 4.13 was developed to filter incoming packets which can be part of HTTP Slow Header
DoS attack, FTP brute force attack or Port scanning. Rest of the attack specific CEP operations
were defined in separate rules and deployed as shown in Figure 5.4. If there is a possibility
of any of these attacks, “Filter Query” sends the packet to the relative output stream. Wisdom
Manager monitors the throughput of “Filter Query” output streams and starts a “Wisdom”
instance with relevant CEP rule if the throughput is greater than 0. If there is no input for an
attack detector for a long time, Wisdom Manager will stop the attack detector. To simulate
real-time behavior, pcap files having no attack, FTP brute force attack, HTTP Slow Header
DoS attack, and Port Scan were fed in order. The memory consumption of this automatic
functionally auto-scaling deployment was compared with manual deployment where all three
“Wisdom” instances were deployed and started using a Wisdom Manager instance without
enabling the functionally auto-scaling feature.
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Figure 5.4: Distributed and Functionally Auto-scaling Deployment – Wisdom Manager
controls the execution of “Wisdom” rules.
Chapter 6
Results
6.1 Phase 1 - Test the MSeq2MSeq model using DARPA 1999
dataset
6.1.1 Test 1.1 - Validate the MSeq2MSeq model using legitimate TCP
connections
In Test 1.1, the model was able to predict connections with 84.97% accuracy and end of con-
nections (σe) with 89.57% accuracy as shown in Figure 6.1. The obtained accuracy values are
highly promising because two packets are considered equal only if all of their attributes are
equal. As discussed in Chapter 5.1, more than 96% of connections have less than 60 packets.
The prediction accuracy increases with number of packets per connection as shown in Figure
6.1.
6.1.2 Hypothesis
If the decoder is unable to find a connection in a stream of events, it will predict the maxi-
mum number of packets allowed for a sequence (τ). Therefore, if the number of packets in
a predicted connection is equal to τ (set to 100 in this experiment), either those packets are
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Figure 6.1: Sequence Prediction Accuracy – prediction accuracy and end of connection (σe)
prediction accuracy.
anomalies or the actual connection has greater than or equal to τ number of packets. However,
if those packets are from an actual connection, the model may be able to predict them with
a higher accuracy even though it cannot reach the end of the connection. According to these
facts, if a predicted connection has close to τ packets with less prediction accuracy, it may be
an anomalous sequence.
6.1.3 Test 1.2 - Determine the minimum accuracy threshold
At the end of Test 1.2, a dataset with the number of packets in each predicted connection
along with the prediction accuracy was prepared. This dataset was clustered using K-means
clustering algorithm into six clusters as shown in Figure 6.2. The number of clusters was
determined by cross-validation. As shown in Table 6.1, Cluster 6 has the lowest accuracy
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Figure 6.2: Clusters of Predicted Connections – cluster 6 has most of the sequences with a
small prediction accuracy and large number of packets per connection.
(12.25%) and a high number of predicted packets (94.47), which supports the above hypothesis.
Even though the model classifies all attacks as anomalies without further distinctions, man-
ual inspection of true positive packets from Cluster 6 reveals that anomalous packets are from
either Port-Sweep probe or Neptune DoS attack. The proposed model is able to identify such
anomalous packets with 97.02% Detection Ratio and 0.07% False Alarm Ratio.
6.1.4 Test 1.3 - Test the ability of the MSeq2MSeq model in real-time
intrusion detection
In Test 1.3, the model was able to raise alarms on all Port-Sweep and Neptune DoS attacks
with 100% true positive rate. Only a single False Alarm was raised in five days of network
traffic. Bontemps et al. claimed 100% true positive alarms and 63 false alarms using LSTM on
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Cluster Accuracy No of packets
1 95.19 97.08
2 61.80 9.52
3 76.52 7.68
4 89.16 13.06
5 76.66 96.49
6 12.25 94.47
Table 6.1: Accuracy and Number of Packets – cluster means of accuracy and number of
predicted packets in Test 1.2.
the same dataset [6]. Furthermore, their model was able to detect only the Neptune DoS attack.
Based on these results, we can claim that the proposed MSeq2MSeq model outperforms LSTM
RNN in detecting anomalies in TCP traffic.
6.2 Phase 2 - Test the Intrusion Detection System using CI-
CIDS 2017 dataset
6.2.1 Test 2.1 - Test the integration of Wisdom Stream Processor with
Machine Learning model
In Test 2.1, the IDS generated 36 false alarms. Considering individual packets in each false
alarms, the IDS classified 0.07% of packets as anomalies and the remaining 99.93% packets as
legitimate packets. Although this is a low percentage, for an IDS, 36 false alarms in a day is not
acceptable. Manual inspection of raw packets revealed that among these false alarms, 24 were
caused by a massive amount of out of order packets, 9 were caused by TLS sequences and the
remaining 3 were caused by a large number of HTTP GET requests sent by a client to a specific
server in a short interval. Though the massive amount of out of order packets and anomalous
GET requests are not intentional attacks in the dataset, they are potential network anomalies
which can be used to attack systems. Therefore, they are treated as potential anomalies and the
IDS is allowed to raise alarms. False alarms caused by TLS sequences are due to the inability of
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the trained model in predicting such sequences. Less number of TLS sequences in the training
data compared to other traffic can be a reason for lower prediction accuracy of TLS sequences.
Test 2.1 also reveals that the model can be used in real-time with our stream processor and the
predictive “Wisdom” rules are working as expected.
6.2.2 Test 2.2 - Test the self-tuning ability of Wisdom Stream Processor
CEP Rule Avg. Precision Avg. Recall
FTP Brute Force 100% 99.61%
Slow Header DoS 100% 96.85%
Port Scan 99.95% 83.80%
Table 6.2: Precision and Recall of Optimized Wisdom Rules – optimized using PSO and
Bisection algorithm in Test 2.2.
As in Table 6.2, “Wisdom” rules optimized by the proposed optimization algorithm was
able to detect selected attacks with a minimum precision of 99.95% and a maximum precision
of 100%. The minimum recall was 83.80% and the maximum recall was 99.85%. The knowl-
edge of domain expert and training data used to optimize the rule determine the accuracy of
a signature-based rule. The port scan detector is looking for a large number of packets with
SYN flags and unique destination port sent within a short interval. Therefore, there is a high
chance of false port scan alarms. Turchin et al. obtained a maximum precision of 80% and a
maximum recall of 90% with their probability-based CEP rule optimized using Kalman Filter
after training the system using the complete dataset [18]. Above results, support the argument
that humans are good at writing high-level signature-based rules and the proposed optimization
algorithm helps to derive optimal threshold values with better accuracy.
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Attack Static Rule Self-tuning Rule
FTP Brute Force 100% 100%
Slow Header DoS 99.96% 100%
Port Scan 71.43% 80.38%
SQL Injection 100% N/A
Table 6.3: Precision of Signature-based Rules – self-tuning “Wisdom” rules performed better
than static rules with user-defined threshold values in Test 2.3.
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Figure 6.3: Timestamp of Alarms Raised by FTP Bruteforce Detector – timestamp of each
alarm raised from the beginning of FTP Bruteforce attack. As time progress, the self-tuning
rule generates alerts slightly faster than the static rule with user-defined thresholds.
6.2.3 Test 2.3 - Test the complete Intrusion Detection System using CI-
CIDS 2017 dataset
In Test 2.3, self-tuning instances of signature-based rules were more accurate than static in-
stances of signature-based rules as given in Table 6.3. It reveals that tuning thresholds in
runtime improves the precision. As shown in Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4, and Figure 6.5 self-tuning
FTP brute force detector raised alarms faster than the static signature-based rule without com-
promising the precision. However, self-tuning instances of DoS detector and Port Scan detector
compromised the latency for precision. The latency versus precision tradeoff is depending on
the loss function and the training data used to optimize the rule. However, considering targetted
attacks, deployed signature-based rules have raised at least one alarm for each attack instances
which claims 100% detection rate.
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Figure 6.4: Timestamp of Alarms Raised by HTTP Slow Header DoS Detector – timestamp
of each alarm raised from the beginning of HTTP Slow Header DoS attack. As time progress,
the self-tuning rule generates alerts significantly later than the static rule with user-defined
thresholds. However, the accuracy of self-tuning rule is slightly better than the accuracy of
static rule.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 25 50 75 100 125
Alarm
Ti
m
e 
fro
m
 th
e 
be
gi
ni
ng
 o
f a
tta
ck
 (s
ec
)
Attention Layer: Static Rule Self−tuning Rule
Figure 6.5: Timestamp of Alarms Raised by Port Scan Detector – timestamp of each alarm
raised from the beginning of Port Scan probe. As time progress, the self-tuning rule generates
alerts significantly later than the static rule with user-defined thresholds. However, the accuracy
of self-tuning rule is significantly better than the accuracy of static rule.
Anomaly-based rules detected 76 unique anomalous sequences. Among them, 63 se-
quences were out of order TCP packets, and 5 sequences were anomalous GET requests. The
remaining sequences were from HULK DoS, Web Brute Force, Cross-site scripting and Ares
Botnet attacks. As discussed earlier in this chapter, out of order packets and anomalous GET
requests are treated as potential anomalies. Therefore the proposed IDS claims 100% detection
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rate with anomaly-based rules. Even though there was an instance of Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack which involves a large volume of anomalous traffic, the anomaly-based
detector was not able to detect it because of the definition of the sequence. Additional CEP
rules are required to detect attacks which cannot be detected by the proposed anomaly-based
detection.
6.3 Phase 3 - Test the functionally auto-scaling ability of Wis-
dom Stream Processor
6.3.1 Test 3.1 - Compare the memory consumption of functionally auto-
scaling deployment with manual deployment
In Test 3.1 manual deployment, the overall memory consumption of every “Wisdom” instances
was between 450 - 500 Megabyte (MB) from the beginning to end (See Figure 6.6). In func-
tionally auto-scaling deployment, Wisdom Manager started Port scanning detector from the
beginning because there were packets matching Port scanning filter even in normal traffic (See
Figure 6.7). FTP brute force detector and HTTP Slow Header DoS were started only after feed-
ing packets containing those attacks. FTP brute force detector was stopped after the attack but
HTTP Slow Header DoS detector was stopped after the actual attack and started a few times
due to some matching packets in later traffic. However, those packets were not reported by DoS
detector as attacks. According to these results, we can conclude that functionally auto-scaling
deployment requires less amount of system resources than running rules all the time without
compromising the accuracy.
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Figure 6.6: Memory Consumption in Manual Deployment – from the beginning, all “Wis-
dom” rules are actively checking for new packets.
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Figure 6.7: Memory Consumption in Functionally Auto-scaling Deployment – Packet Filter
runs all the time, but other attack detectors run only if there is a possibility for those attacks.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this research, a novel MSeq2MSeq machine learning model, and an adaptive and function-
ally auto-scaling stream processor “Wisdom” were proposed to build an IDS for both anomaly-
based and signature-based intrusion detection. The IDS developed using both machine learn-
ing and stream processing techniques was able to detect eight attacks with 100% detection rate.
Above results are obtained by simulating a real-time network traffic by feeding streams of pack-
ets read from raw pcap files. In an attack which requires a lot of packets like DoS, the proposed
IDS raises several alarms continuously. Therefore, the proposed IDS can be used to prevent
network intrusions at their initial stage by modifying firewall rules with the first alarm gener-
ated by the IDS. Even though the MSeq2MSeq model has been used for packet prediction, it
has a wide range of applications in other MSeq2MSeq problems like weather forecasting with
multiple features and stock prediction. The “Wisdom” can be used as a general purpose stream
processor with the ability to adapt itself, start new rules to add more features and stop unwanted
rules to decrease resource consumption. Compared to signature-based rules, anomaly-based
rules cannot differentiate a benign anomaly like an out of order packet from an attack. On the
other hand, it is not always possible for a domain expert to come up with a signature to detect
unknown attacks with false positive rates that are low enough for practical use. Therefore,
combining both signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection takes the advantage of
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signature-based rules without missing unknown attacks. Another advantage of using stream
processor as an IDS is the ability to utilize external resources like system logs and knowledge
about hosted services and legitimate users. However, none of them were used in this research
because none of the publicly available datasets provide such additional information.
Compared to popular IDS’s like Snort, the proposed IDS offers functionally auto-scaling
deployment, SQL like query, anomaly-based intrusion detection, and self-tuning rules. The
ability of the proposed IDS in processing events received from different sources makes it suit-
able to detect attacks with high accuracy. Among the four challenges raised by Sommer and
Paxon, the proposed IDS has addressed the first three problems. The last challenge: “lack
of appropriate public datasets” still affects the research because the accuracy of the machine
learning model is depending on the quality of training data. Furthermore, the CICIDS 2017
dataset does not contain multiple occurrences of the same attack at different times which limits
testing the long-term benefit of self-tuning rules. However, creating an ideal dataset is beyond
the scope of this research. Training the machine learning model using more data will increase
the accuracy of the anomaly-based detector. Similarly, writing new signature-based rules for
every known attack will make the signature-based detector to detect all those attacks. As a
future direction, I recommend deploying the proposed IDS in a honeynet for a long period
with new self-tuning signature-based rules to test the long-term effect of the self-tuning IDS. A
honeynet can also be used to test advanced signature-based rules using additional information
sources like application logs and to continuously train the MSeq2MSeq model using the traffic
received by the honeynet.
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Appendix A
Signature-based Wisdom Rules
A.1 HTTP SlowHeader Detector
@app(name=‘HTTPSlowHeaderDetector ’, version=’1.0.0’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’)
def stream PacketStream;
@sink(type=‘console ’)
@sink(type=‘file.text’, path=‘/tmp/dos_attack.txt’)
def stream DoSAttackStream;
@config(trainable=true, minimum=100, maximum=60000, step=-1)
def variable time_threshold = 1189;
@config(trainable=true, minimum=3, maximum=1000, step=1)
def variable count_threshold = 3;
from PacketStream
filter ‘http’ == app_protocol and
dst_port == 80 and ‘\r\n\r\n’ in data
and ‘Keep-Alive: \\d+’ matches data
partition by dst_ip
window.externalTimeBatch(‘timestamp ’, $time_threshold)
aggregate count() as no_of_packets
filter no_of_packets >= $count_threshold
select src_ip, dst_ip, timestamp
insert into DoSAttackStream;
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A.2 FTP Brute Force Detector
@app(name=’FTPBruteForceDetector ’, version=’1.0.0’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’)
def stream PacketStream;
@sink(type=‘console ’)
@sink(type=‘file.text’, path=‘/tmp/ftp_brute_force_attack.txt’)
def stream FTPBruteForceAttack;
@config(trainable=true, minimum=100, maximum=60000, step=-1)
def variable time_threshold = 3220;
@config(trainable=true, minimum=3, maximum=1000, step=1)
def variable count_threshold = 7;
from PacketStream
filter ‘FTP[CONTROL]’ == app_protocol and ‘530 Login incorrect ’
in data
partition by dst_ip
window.externalTimeBatch(’timestamp ’, $time_threshold)
aggregate count() as no_of_packets
filter no_of_packets >= $count_threshold
select src_ip, dst_ip, no_of_packets , timestamp
insert into FTPBruteForceAttack;
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A.3 Port Scan Detector
@app(name=’PortScanDetector ’, version=’1.0.0’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’)
def stream PacketStream;
@sink(type=‘console ’)
@sink(type=‘file.text’, path=‘/tmp/port_scan_probe.txt’)
def stream PortScanProbe;
@config(trainable=true, minimum=100, maximum=60000, step=-1)
def variable time_threshold = 108;
@config(trainable=true, minimum=3, maximum=1000, step=1)
def variable count_threshold = 9;
from PacketStream
filter syn == true and ack == false
partition by src_ip + dst_ip
window.unique:externalTimeBatch(‘dst_port ’, ‘timestamp ’,
$time_threshold)
aggregate count() as no_of_packets
filter no_of_packets >= $count_threshold
select src_ip, dst_ip, no_of_packets , timestamp
insert into PortScanProbe;
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A.4 SQL Injection Detector
@app(name=’SQLInjectionDetector ’, version=’1.0.0’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’)
def stream PacketStream;
@sink(type=‘console ’)
@sink(type=‘file.text’, path=‘/tmp/sql_injection_probe.txt’)
def stream SQLInjectionAttack;
from PacketStream
filter app_protocol == ‘HTTP’
and ‘/dv/vulnerabilities/sqli/’ in data
select src_ip, dst_ip, timestamp
insert into SQLInjectionAttack;
Appendix B
Anomaly-based Wisdom Rules
B.1 TCP Packets Filter
@app(name=‘TCPPacketsFilter ’, version=’1.0.0’, playback=‘timestamp ’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’)
def stream PacketStream;
@sink(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’, topic=‘TCPStream ’)
def stream TCPStream;
from PacketStream
filter transport_layer == ‘TCP’ and
not (src_port == 443 or dst_port == 443)
select highest_layer , transport_layer , src_ip, src_port , dst_ip,
dst_port , ip_flag, transport_flag , timestamp
partition by src_ip + dst_ip
map copy(‘src_ip ’) as srcIp, copy(‘dst_ip ’) as dstIp
window.idleTimeLengthBatch(time.sec(1), 1000)
limit 320
aggregate collect(‘src_ip ’) as src_ip,
collect(‘dst_ip ’) as dst_ip, collect(‘ip_flag ’) as ip_flag,
collect(‘transport_flag ’) as transport_flag ,
collect(‘transport_layer ’) as transport_layer ,
collect(‘highest_layer ’) as highest_layer
select src_ip, dst_ip, highest_layer , transport_layer , src_ip,
dst_ip, ip_flag, transport_flag , srcIp, dstIp, timestamp
map len(‘ip_flag ’) as no_of_packets
insert into TCPStream;
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B.2 UDP Packets Filter
@app(name=‘UDPPacketsFilter ’, version=’1.0.0’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’)
def stream PacketStream;
@sink(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’, topic=‘UDPStream ’)
def stream UDPStream;
from PacketStream
filter transport_layer == ‘UDP’
select highest_layer , transport_layer , src_ip, src_port , dst_ip,
dst_port , ip_flag, transport_flag , timestamp
partition by src_ip + dst_ip
map copy(‘src_ip ’) as srcIp, copy(‘dst_ip ’) as dstIp
window.idleTimeLengthBatch(time.sec(1), 1000)
limit 320
aggregate collect(‘src_ip ’) as src_ip,
collect(‘dst_ip ’) as dst_ip, collect(‘ip_flag ’) as ip_flag,
collect(‘transport_flag ’) as transport_flag ,
collect(‘transport_layer ’) as transport_layer ,
collect(‘highest_layer ’) as highest_layer
select src_ip, dst_ip, highest_layer , transport_layer , src_ip,
dst_ip, ip_flag, transport_flag , srcIp, dstIp, timestamp
map len(‘ip_flag ’) as no_of_packets
insert into UDPStream;
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B.3 TCP Bucket Connector
@app(name=‘TCPBucketConnector ’, version=’1.0.0’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’, topic=‘TCPStream ’)
def stream TCPStream;
@sink(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’, topic=‘
ProcessedStream ’)
def stream ProcessedStream;
from TCPStream
filter no_of_packets > 3 and no_of_packets <= 10
map grpc(’localhost:9001’, ’accuracy ’) as accuracy
insert into ProcessedStream;
from TCPStream
filter no_of_packets > 10 and no_of_packets <= 20
map grpc(’localhost:9002’, ’accuracy ’) as accuracy
insert into ProcessedStream;
from TCPStream
filter no_of_packets > 20 and no_of_packets <= 40
map grpc(’localhost:9003’, ’accuracy ’) as accuracy
insert into ProcessedStream;
from TCPStream
filter no_of_packets > 40 and no_of_packets <= 80
map grpc(’localhost:9004’, ’accuracy ’) as accuracy
insert into ProcessedStream;
from TCPStream
filter no_of_packets > 80 and no_of_packets <= 160
map grpc(’localhost:9005’, ’accuracy ’) as accuracy
insert into ProcessedStream;
from TCPStream
filter no_of_packets > 160 and no_of_packets <= 320
map grpc(’localhost:9006’, ’accuracy ’) as accuracy
insert into ProcessedStream;
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B.4 UDP Bucket Connector
@app(name=‘UDPBucketConnector ’, version=’1.0.0’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’, topic=‘UDPStream ’)
def stream UDPStream;
@sink(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’, topic=‘
ProcessedStream ’)
def stream ProcessedStream;
from UDPStream
filter no_of_packets > 3 and no_of_packets <= 10
map grpc(’localhost:9101’, ’accuracy ’) as accuracy
insert into ProcessedStream;
from UDPStream
filter no_of_packets > 10 and no_of_packets <= 20
map grpc(’localhost:9102’, ’accuracy ’) as accuracy
insert into ProcessedStream;
from UDPStream
filter no_of_packets > 20 and no_of_packets <= 40
map grpc(’localhost:9103’, ’accuracy ’) as accuracy
insert into ProcessedStream;
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B.5 Processed Stream Filter
@app(name=‘ProcessedStreamFilter ’, version=’1.0.0’)
@source(type=‘kafka’, bootstrap=‘localhost:9002’, topic=‘
ProcessedStream ’)
def stream ProcessedStream;
@sink(type=‘console ’)
@sink(type=‘file.text’, path=‘/tmp/anomalous_attacks.txt’)
def stream AttackStream;
from ProcessedStream
filter accuracy > 0 and accuracy < 0.125
select srcIp, dstIp, timestamp , no_of_packets , accuracy
insert into AttackStream;
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